The passionate state of denial of Wall Street’s remaining independent investment bankers is palpable. How can so many smart and innovative people not see the changes on their way? Passion is a powerful force, and it is working its way through the world’s financial markets. Fear, as equally destructive as any of the other four human passions of love, hate, avarice and jealousy, has swept all before it, while avarice, the most cunning of the senses, sits back and wonders what went wrong.
The denial that massive changes are required to the global financial system has been evident since August last year, and was reiterated recently by comments from the two remaining Wall Street investment banks that they can remain independent. True, they have plenty of capital, relative to their recently demised peers, but the issue has never really been about capital – Bear, AIG, IndyMac, Countrywide and Lehman had liquidity problems. Why? Mostly because their business model was reliant on short term funding from other (competitor) banks. How can so many have forgotten Continental Illinois – which grew too fast, got caught and became too reliant on European interbank lines? (see page 242 of the FDIC’s History of the Eighties, Lessons for the Future – http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/235_258.pdf). Although Bank of America and Citicorp have suffered from the mark down of their investment portfolios, eventually, these portfolios will be entirely written off, but both banks have a rich pool of stable, cheap, retail deposits to fund their remaining assets so they can rebuild their depleted capital. Goldmans and Morgan do not. JP Morgan (Chase) can fund Bears’ businesses, while BoA can fund Merrill. The other part of the equation was leverage and the SEC’s relaxation of this key ratio in 2004. The quote I always use from Willie Purves, the former chairman of HSBC, applies now more than ever: “a bank can never have enough capital”. However, I’m sure Willie would like to add, in the same breath, that the ratio of assets to capital should be prudently managed at all times (good and bad). On both the issue of investments and capital employment the principals have failed the agents. Bosses somehow where so busy counting their bonuses (and figuring out how to avoid paying taxes and which charity/foundation to aid/form) that they were not watching what their agents/traders were doing. They delegated responsibility because they were unfamiliar with what the agents were doing. The bottom line, preferably every three months, was showing wonderful bonuses ahead, why probe into something that wasn’t broken. Also, principals/regulators were watching their leverage ratios rise, but seemed oblivious to the dangers. This was partly due to the relaxation of supervision by central bankers, which had slowly allowed Capital Adequacy Ratios to fall over the years. Even the most conservative of regulators like the Hong Kong Monetary Authority were happy to let the CARs of local banks fall in Hong Kong (although this reversed in 1Q 2008, as the regulator realized the error of its ways).
Capital adequacy ratio of Hong Kong banks (%)
So now we have a situation (actually the same situation of the past nine months – only more pronounced) of banks unwilling to lend (unsecured) to each other because they are not sure they will be repaid tomorrow. Central Banks have solved this issue by opening their balance sheets. This is what central banks are supposed to do – so no problems there (the short term revulsion of doing this will eventually be proven to be wrong – as Hong Kong has learned after the HKMA’s intervention in the local equity market in 1998). In order to solve the rest of the problems, eventually three events will have to happen: 1) the US housing market related investments will be written down to zero (this has almost happened in Hong Kong and the Treasuries’ so-called Troubled Asset Relief Programme will produce the same result) 2) the investment banks will have to find new, cash-rich, business partners (not shareholders), who can finance their very profitable businesses and 3) banks must start lending to each other at rates that reflect no repayment fear. The credit crunch would have happened anyway because commercial banks were running of capital (as they always do as the economic cycle turns down). On the regulatory side,
When the dust finally settles several investment themes will present themselves. First, many asset prices are currently at big cycle lows. Second, economic activity is still expanding (albeit quite slowly). Third, in order to preserve the new found confidence of the world’s financial system, interest rates will remain low. Those banks that survive the current shake out will be required to live by a new set of rules, which will include a need to rebuild capital ratios back to the levels of the past. This will be achieved with the help of a steeper yield curve. Based on these premises the following actions will prove very profitable: buy equities:sell bonds.
The crush of Hong Kong equity prices in the past week is not justified based on fundamentals, with the equity risk premium currently trading at historic highs. At 10x earnings, the index is at its historic low valuation. This is not a consolidation area, this is a cycle bottom. The overshoot last week means I am keeping 18,700 as the cycle bottom, until it is confirmed that the measures introduced last week are working (i.e. market volatility declines, Libor settles and credit spreads narrow).
HS Index equity risk premium (%)
Trading patterns confirm that the decline in prices in the past week was due to liquidation pressures (AIG, Lehman, UBS, hedge funds etc), which will eventually abate. There were few buyers during the sell-off on Wednesday/Thursday, as Hong Kong’s up-tick rule effectively bars short selling in Hong Kong (something that is now being implemented elsewhere). But, there was plenty of elevated action in the Index’s futures contract (150k trades a day) because it is possible to leverage (expect the margin to be lifted this week) and short it.
Short-futures covering started the V shaped recovery that I predicted in the last newsletter. The index is now at a cycle bottom, but how it recovers from here will depend on several factors: 1) whether the factors listed earlier will prevail, 2) what will HSBC reveal when it finally decides to do something with its supposed US$8 billion in free capital (besides pull out of the Korea Exchange deal), and 3) how long it will take for the panic to cease (which is highly related to the first two points). There are more changes ahead.
One thing that doesn’t ever change is that horrible sinking feeling in your stomach while watching stock prices fall 10% in a day, for no apparent reason (de-leveraging is causing de-risking, which throws fundamentals out of the [discount] window). I experienced that feeling again this week, and I had to remind myself that it was the same feeling I felt during all the other market meltdowns I’ve seen over the years. It’s a feeling that you can never get used to, but it is also a feeling that eventually goes away, to be stored away in the memory banks until the next time it happens. It’s just a passing passion.





