It used to be, in the days of colonial rule in Hong Kong, that if ever there was a problem that required an answer, Hong Kong officials could pick up the phone and call someone in Whitehall for help. Quite often, the answer was simply a repetition of what was already the practice in the UK. Hong Kong’s soon to retire central bank chief, Joseph Yam, would have been privy to many of those exchanges, particularly those relating to the banking system. As a career civil servant, he would have understood the rationale behind the decisions and would have been coached in their interpretation by the likes of John Bembridge, Piers Jacobs, David Nendick, David Carse and, of course, his current boss Donald Tsang.
Having never worked in the private sector, Joseph Yam was never directly influenced by the pressures of shareholder activism (although he was under constant pressure to produce returns on Hong Kong’s fiscal reserves), and he was an appointed official – so he was never directly accountable to the public. This lack of scrutiny has been a real plus for Hong Kong and the management of its financial system. Yam could plan long term secure in the knowledge that he will be given time to see his policies and actions come to their natural conclusion.
For Yam, being a natural Keynesian/non-monetarist, he should feel quite content in his retirement knowing that his economic philosophy has been justified by the recent actions of the Anglo-Saxon monetarists. However, there is, again, a need for him to take some time to declare a longer term victory. The jury is still out on whether the liquidity pumping currently going on around the world (Hong Kong included) has produced the right conditions for an economic recovery.
Joseph Yam’s tour de force of course was the intervention in the local equity market in August 1998. The plan was simple – knock out the shorts by buying US$15 billion worth of Hong Kong stocks. Attacking the Hong Kong dollar and naked shorting the Hang Seng Index futures contract was a simple enough strategy by the hedge funds. They had that saw a chink in Hong Kong currency peg’s armour. Yam’s response was also simple, buy back spot shares, and cause the hedge funds to lose so much on their futures contracts that they could at best break even, or, mostly take losses. The strike was done with brilliant stealth (for a town built on whispers and tips) no one was aware of the plan until half way through its execution. I remember watching the event unfold from a trading desk as rumour surfaced that the Hong Kong Jockey Club was buying shares. His rumour eventually morphed into direct government intervention. My initial reaction was the same as everyone else – this is madness. However, in hindsight, the timing was perfect. In this case, discretion ruled over rule, although Hong Kong’s ruled based currency peg and small government have always seemed like major contractions to the Keynesians running the economy.
A little less well known was Yam’s involvement in helping to secure a “lifeboat” for the futures exchange when Hong Kong’s stock market closed down for four days after the crash of October 1987. Although his role was minor (Sir Piers and Nendick were the chief instigators), I suspect, judging from his fond memories of that event, that it had a lasting impression on him and, to some extent, cemented his credentials for future interventions.
Yam’s successor has some big shoes to follow (many people do not realize that Yam stands well over six foot, which for a 61 year old Chinese is quite a feat). The front runner appears to be Norman Chan, who is currently vice-chairman of Standard Chartered Asia. If Chan was still with the HKMA, I believe he would fit the bill, but he has been tempted by the dark side of the commercial world, and surely could not revert back to a career civil servant in a hurry. Chan knew that Yam would retire soon, so why did he leave if he wanted the job? Instead, I believe the HKMA will promote from within, and pick one of the three current deputy chiefs. As banking supervision is a key area for the HKMA in current circumstances, YK Choi would be the natural choice. However, YK is probably too old having started his career in 1974. Eddie Yue looks after the reserves, while Peter Pang deals with external matters. Both are similar in age, so I would plum for Pang – the diplomat. All three have been groomed for the job, and are Yam protégés.
As close confidants of Yam, the three internal contenders should be fully up to speed on the efforts by the HKMA to ensure an adequate supply of Hong Kong dollars in the banking system. The Aggregate Balance is currently standing at record levels of HK$250 billion. It is this liquidity that is the most visible proof of the rise of the Hang Seng Index in recent weeks. In the debate about whether the rebound from the low on March is liquidity driven or fundamentally driven, the liquid angle wins, as the chart below shows.
Equity volume vs earnings growth change (re-based to 100)
Yam’s successor should be watching developments in the local equity market closely to ensure that there is the right balance between a liquidity driven rise in equity prices, compared with a rise in values discounting a realistic upturn in the fundamentals of the China and Hong Kong economies and therefore the profitability of listed companies.
Unfortunately, it would appear that this David Beers analyst at S&P has not been paying much attention. The decision to downgrade the outlook of the UK’s debt at this time suggests his vision has been blurred by too much self esteem and not enough self assessment. For one thing, if the decision was based on the budget deficit data which was released on Thursday, then the downgrade was done in haste. This is a perfect example of a wounded, major duopoly, attempting to regain credibility when there is nothing it can do to restore its reputation. S&P has always been late in its assessments of everything because of a flawed system of “rules over discretion”. The rule is: when the debt of a country reaches 100% of GDP, downgrade the outlook. However, if the S&P analyst had bothered to check out of the window, he would have seen signs of a restoration of consumer confidence. By downgrading, he has just shot down those signs, just so he can 1) get on TV 2) restore his credibility and 3) put the fear back into his ratings (i.e. the threat of a downgrade has the potential to bring the world’s financial markets back down on its knees). His timing was impeccable because credit markets had shown strong signs of recovery, with indices actually higher than they were prior to Lehman’s demise (equities in fact have only been playing catch up with credit). However, I have to wonder why global asset markets initially reacted so violently on the downside (they have since recovered from the lows). Yes prices were a little elevated, but one has to wonder how solid is the current recovery. Certainly the permabears would have rejoiced at the reaction, but they will get their comeuppance when prices recover this week. As the saying goes: investors are only good at one thing: forgetting. One hope locally is that the government remembers that a career civil servant has held Hong Kong’s financial system in check for over 16 years, and that his successor should continue this trend.





